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Pleasures of the Imagination” 
 
It is undoubtedly his close connection to Cartesianism1 which leads the French 
philosopher Nicolas Malebranche at the end of the 17th century to pay little attention 
to the relevance of the imagination for the realm of the visible. His programme of 
rationalism with its ambition to marginalize the human faculty of creating images by 
assigning it to a worthless sense perception renders it almost impossible to recognize 
the constitutive function of this faculty for visuality in general. 
 
A few decades later, however, things change with the emergence of empiricism and 
the publication of John Locke’s Essay concerning Human Understanding, especially 
with regard to the differentiation between primary and secondary qualities.2 
According to this distinction, qualities like colours, sounds and tastes are not part of 
the material object itself but constructed in the process of perception. In contrast to 
primary qualities like extension and figure, which belong directly to the material 
object, secondary qualities like colours, sounds and tastes emerge from the 
imagination, proving it to be an important part of perception in general. Concerning 
these particular notions, it was Locke who gave Joseph Addison the cue for his Essay 
on the Pleasures of the Imagination.3 As unmistakably announced in the title of his 
essay, Addison undertakes nothing less than a counter-programme to Malebranche’s 
devaluation of the imagination, turning towards the delights affiliated with this faculty 
and at the same time attempting to establish a theoretical approach. Unlike other 
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discourses on the imagination4, he does not attempt to defend or justify a ‚lesser’ 
human faculty. Rather, his goal is to assign a place to the human ability to create 
images within aesthetic theory.5 It is significant and should be regarded as 
groundbreaking6 for subsequent theoretical approaches—not least for Romantic 
poetics—that Addison conceptualizes the imaginative faculty as a decidedly visual 
operation, premised on Locke’s theorem of the two kinds of qualities. 
 
His Essay on the Pleasures of the Imagination appeared in the summer of 1712 in The 
Spectator, which he edited together with his friend Richard Steele. Addison begins by 
immediately emphasizing the sense of sight as the finest of all: “Our sight is the most 
perfect and most delightful of all our senses. It fills the mind with the largest variety 
of ideas, converses with its objects at the greatest distance, and continues the longest 
in action without being tired or satiated with its proper enjoyments.”7 Based on 
empirical premises, it is sight which most excellently provides the mind with a great 
variety of ideas. Therefore it is first and foremost this sense which carries out the 
preliminary work for the imagination in supplying it with material: 
 
 
It is this sense which furnishes the imagination with its ideas; so that by 
the pleasures of the imagination, or fancy, (which I shall use 
promiscuously), I here mean such as arise from visible objects, either 
when we have them actually in our view, or when we call up their ideas 
into our minds by paintings, statues, descriptions, or any the like 
occasion. We cannot, indeed, have a single image in the fancy that did 
not make its first entrance through the sight; but we have the power of 
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retaining, altering, and compounding those images, which we have once 
received, into all the varieties of picture and vision that are most 
agreeable to the imagination; for by this faculty a man in a dungeon is 
capable of entertaining himself with scenes and landscapes more 
beautiful than any that can be found in the whole compass of nature.8 
 
 
Opening his considerations thus, preceded only by an enumeration of common 
definitions of the imagination, Addison unequivocally signals his aim to ascribe 
positive attributes to the imaginary process. Rather than belabouring the adverse 
effects of a frail faculty, he argues that the imagination has the potential to excel 
nature. All at once it is conceivable that the absence of real objects no longer leads 
inevitably to the delusional presence of imaginary simulacra; in fact, this absence 
clears the way for an aesthetic experience which lies beyond what nature has to offer. 
Consequently, the visible world marks only the point of departure from which mental 
visibility is rendered possible, evolving from the retaining, altering and compounding 
of visual data and hence resulting in delight. In spite of this dependence on an initial 
input of material, mental sight proves to be the more powerful. And Addison leaves 
no doubt that imagination is indeed a way of seeing: 
 
 
I must therefore desire him [the reader] to remember, that by the 
pleasures of the imagination, I mean only such pleasures as arise 
originally from sight, and that I divide these pleasures into two kinds 
my design being first of all to discourse of those primary pleasures of 
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the imagination, which entirely proceed from such objects as are before 
our eyes; and in the next place to speak of those secondary pleasures of 
the imagination which flow from the ideas of visible objects, when the 
objects are not actually before the eye, but are called up into our 
memories, or formed into agreeable visions of things that are either 
absent or fictitious.9 
 
 
Because imagination is fundamentally involved in perception, thereby rendering sight 
without imagination completely impossible, Addison feels obliged to distinguish 
between two forms of pleasure concerning sight. The primary and secondary 
pleasures of the imagination arise from visual qualities to the same extent and only 
differ from one another with regard to the presence and reality of their objects. The 
first pleasure of the act of visual perception is therefore already a pleasure of the 
imagination, for colours are—in terms of Locke10—images deriving from our mind 
and not from the outside world: “It is but opening the eye, and the scene enters. The 
colours paint themselves on the fancy, with very little attention of thought or 
application of mind in the beholder.”11 According to Addison the second pleasure of 
the absent or fictitious visual ideas is not simply a pale variety of the first; it is a much 
greater pleasure as it can dispose ideas without restriction: “The pleasures of these 
secondary views of the imagination are of a wider and more universal nature than 
those it has when joined with sight[.]”12 Addison discovers the principle of this 
secondary pleasure in an old acquaintance in the occidental theory of images, the 
concept of similarity13: “Here, therefore, we must inquire after a new principle of 
pleasure, which is nothing else but the action of the mind, which compares the ideas 
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that arise from words, with the ideas that arise from the objects themselves[.]”14 With 
the relation of similarity, he can link the mental visibility with that of the outside 
world and gains an explanation that—as he is convinced—can hardly be surpassed. 
Ultimately the pleasure derived from the secondary view of the imagination is the 
incentive for the pursuit of knowledge and truth.15 
 
A different context of explanation, however, moves him again closer to Malebranche 
and the concept of animal spirits, albeit with a turn towards a positive evaluation: 
“Delightful scenes, whether in nature, painting, or poetry, have a kindly influence on 
the body, as well as the mind, and not only serve to clear and brighten the 
imagination, but are able to disperse grief and melancholy, and to set the animal 
spirits in pleasing and agreeable motions.”16 Not only the mind is enlivened in its 
pursuit of truth, but also the body profits from an active imagination by setting the 
animal spirits into an agreeable movement. For Malebranche, in the first place there is 
the danger that the animal spirits flow habitually through the same channels in the 
brain, always producing the same ideas. Addison, while using the same metaphors, 
comes to a completely different scenario. He interprets the relation between the 
movement of the animal spirits and the ‘traces’ in the brain in a rather optimistic 
manner; in light of the principle of association17 he sees a potential in the violent 
freedom of these movements: 
 
 
The set of ideas, which we received from such a prospect or garden, 
having entered the mind at the same time, have a set of traces belonging 
to them in the brain, bordering very near upon one another; when, 
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therefore, any one of these ideas arises in the imagination, and 
consequently dispatches a flow of animal spirits to its proper trace, 
these spirits, in the violence of their motion, run not only into the trace 
to which they were more particularly directed, but into several of those 
that lie about it: by this means they awaken other ideas of the same set, 
which immediately determine a new dispatch of spirits that in the same 
manner open other neighbouring traces, till at last the whole set of them 
is blown up, and the whole prospect or garden flourishes in the 
imagination.18 
 
 
Addison gives a physical fundament to the explosive unfolding of a complex 
imaginary scenario by correlating the facility of the movement of the animal spirits to 
a subversive imagination, which is not only capable of surpassing nature but also of 
perfecting the reality of art.19 The imaginative activity of the mind is destined to 
compensate for deficiencies of nature and presents itself as a remedy for natural 
defects. The poet in particular as the bearer of a strong imagination is specified as the 
medium for the self-contained practice of the imagination: “But this is certain, that a 
noble writer should be born with this faculty in its full strength and vigor, so as to be 
able to receive lively ideas from outward objects, to retain them long, and to range 
them together, upon occasion, in such figures and representations as are most likely to 
hit the fancy of the reader.”20 His art consists primarily in modelling the acquired 
material with great independence from reality in order to provide aesthetic pleasure 
for others. This, of course, requires a minimum of imaginative power on the part of 
the recipient, and Addison knows that the ability to discriminate and to associate ideas 
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is not always fully at the reader’s disposal. The beauties of mental imagery are 
reserved for the warm and energetic imagination.21 Having no mastery of the basic 
imaginative operations means that one is hardly capable of perceiving or experiencing 
beauty: “A man who is deficient in either of these respects, though he may receive the 
general notion of a description, can never see distinctly all its particular beauties[.]”22 
Since seeing and imagination are tightly connected, such a person’s ability of visual 
perception is limited at even the most basic level, rendering it impossible for him to 
discriminate the diversity of colours and forms and to perceive their interaction in a 
pleasing way: “[A] person with a weak sight may have the confused prospect of a 
place that lies before him, without entering into its several parts, or discerning the 
variety of its colours in their full glory and perfection.”23 Out of this question of the 
individual disposition to a strong or weak imagination, Addison finally develops an 
early version of the Kantian concept of disinterested pleasure24. He ascribes to the 
imaginatively talented the ability to refrain from the inferior pleasure of possessing 
something in order to arrive at the more satisfactory delight at the mere sight of it: “A 
man of polite imagination is let into a great many pleasures, that the vulgar are not 
capable of receiving. He can converse with a picture, and find an agreeable 
companion in a statue. He meets with a secret refreshment in a description, and often 
feels a greater satisfaction in the prospect of fields and meadows, than another does in 
the possession.”25 The virtuality of imagined things allows a “secret refreshment,” and 
while dealing with the content of the imagination the chance arises to surpass all the 
perceptions that are all-too bound to reality simply by their subjective visibility. 
 
In contrast to modern two-fold aesthetics26 Addison projects a three-fold version and 
operates – in addition to the categories of the sublime and the beautiful – with the 
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third category of the uncommon or new: “I shall first consider those pleasures of the 
imagination which arise from the actual view and survey of outward objects; and 
these, I think, all proceed from the sight of what is great, uncommon, or beautiful.”27  
 
This third domain adopts the eminent aesthetic function to direct the body as well as 
the mind out of their habitual channels and to vitalize them by diversifying their ideas:  
 
 
Everything that is new or uncommon raises a pleasure in the imagination, 
because it fills the soul with an agreeable surprise, gratifies its curiosity, and 
gives it an idea of which it was not before possessed. [It] contributes a little to 
vary human life, and to divert our minds for a while with the strangeness of its 
appearance: it serves us for a kind of refreshment, […].28  
 
 
Nevertheless, it is ultimately the category of the beautiful which not only offers most 
directly aesthetic pleasure, but also forms the capstone for the other two registers of 
delightful visibility: “But there is nothing that makes its way more directly to the soul 
than beauty, which immediately diffuses a secret satisfaction and complacency 
through the imagination, and gives a finishing to anything that is great or 
uncommon.”29 By this means even unpleasant effects of the uncommon are 
integrated: “It is this [the beautiful new] that bestows charms on a monster, and makes 
even the imperfections of nature please us.”30 In other words, following Addison, 
aesthetics of the ugly and of horror31 become imaginable under the aegis of the 
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beautiful. However, it is not only the finalizing by the beautiful, but also the safe 
distance which renders the horror of the imagination agreeable:  
 
 
When we look on such hideous objects, we are not a little pleased to think we 
are in no danger of them. We consider them, at the same time, as dreadful and 
harmless; so that the more frightful appearance they make, the greater is the 
pleasure we receive from the sense of our own safety.32  
 
 
It is remarkable that at this point in his argumentation the potential of innovation fully 
unfolds at the same time that the limits of the concept manifest clearly in the form of 
an ambivalence with far-reaching consequences. Indeed, the imagination turns out to 
be an equally effective medium for negative emotions and their intensification when 
the safe distance is no longer given: “We have now discovered the several originals of 
those pleasures that gratify the fancy; and here, perhaps, it would not be very difficult 
to cast under their proper heads those contrary objects, which are apt to fill it with 
distaste and terror; for the imagination is as liable to pain as pleasure.”33 In order to 
explain the imagination’s cultivation of both unpleasant feelings and states of anxiety 
Addison once again refers to the concept of animal spirits. According to this notion 
the loss of control over the unpleasant contents of the imagination corresponds to 
physical damage, so that the fatal confusion of those contents is understood as the 
disorder of ideas in the brain:  
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When the brain is hurt by any accident, or the mind disordered by dreams or 
sickness, the fancy is overrun with wild dismal ideas, and terrified with a 
thousand hideous monsters of its own framing. […] There is not a sight in 
Nature so mortifying as that of a distracted person, when his imagination is 
troubled, and his whole soul disordered and confused.34 
 
 
The ambivalence of the imagination finally presents itself as a deficiency in this 
faculty and a constraint on what it is capable of achieving. In comparison with the 
understanding, the imagination has only a limited capacity and quickly reaches a 
maximum of processible content: “I think it [this subject] may show us the proper 
limits, as well as the defectiveness, of our imagination; how it is confined to a very 
small quantity of space, and immediately stopped in its operations, when it endeavors 
to take in anything that is very great, or very little.”35 The ability to think the infinite 
is not at the disposal of the imagination; in fact, the never-ending abundance of matter 
is an overwhelming abyss for this faculty in light of the narrow spectrum of matter 
that can be grasped imaginatively. “The understanding, indeed, opens an infinite 
space on every side of us, but the imagination, after a few faint efforts, is immediately 
at a stand, and finds herself swallowed up in the immensity of the void that surrounds 
it.”36 In spite of the imagination’s deficiencies vis-à-vis the understanding, Addison 
insists on the importance of the imaginative faculty, especially since a productive 
cooperation can be experienced at any time in the context of aesthetic perception:  
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[W]e are able to see something like colour and shape in a notion, and to 
discover a scheme of thoughts traced out upon matter. And here the mind 
receives a great deal of satisfaction, and has two of its faculties gratified at the 
same time, while the fancy is busy in copying after the understanding, and 
transcribing ideas out of the intellectual world into the material.37  
 
 
The cooperation of “fancy” and “understanding” figures as a double satisfaction, 
behind which the possible hierarchy of faculties38 recedes into the background, for, to 
some extent, it is in the interaction of the two that the aesthetic experience becomes 
possible in the first place. 
 
It would seem that the concept of an imaginative core in all aesthetic perceptions and 
objects is an important attainment of the early Enlightenment in establishing the 
significance of the faculty of the imagination. The panegyric on the pleasures, all of 
which are rooted in the human ability to create images, and the development of a 
theoretical fundament must be considered an eminent achievement for the time, a 
clean break from Cartesianism’s devaluation of this part of human ability. 
  
Accordingly, the influence of these thoughts should not be underestimated; it extends 
throughout the 18th century from Bodmer/Breitinger, Baumgarten, Lessing and Kant 
to Romanticism. Addison’s “influential treatment”39 consists especially in his 
emphasis on the visual adjustment of the imagination, the exposing of mental 
visibility at the very centre of all aesthetic experience. But even his assigning of a 
certain amount of power to this faculty is haunted by the reservation that the 
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imagination is always subject to unpredictable ambivalence. On the one hand, poets in 
their world of images are certainly offered the magnificent opportunity to make the 
invisible accessible to the reader: “[I]n the survey of any object we have only so much 
of it painted on the imagination as comes in at the eye; but in its description the poet 
gives us as free a view of it as he pleases, and discovers to us several parts that either 
we did not attend to, or that lay out of our sight when we first beheld it.”40 But on the 
other hand the imagination is also susceptible to abuse: “We have already seen the 
influence that one man has over the fancy of another, and with what ease he conveys 
into it a variety of imagery[.]”41 In conclusion, the productivity of the imagination 
proves to be double-edged. Nevertheless, despite its inherent ambivalence, Addison 
clearly allows a benevolent perspective to dominate. 
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